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The financial crisis in 1997 caused serious deterioration of the Korean economy.  We examined 
the credit crunch in Korea and how it affected household welfare.  With household panel data 
from 1996-1998, we estimated a switching regression model of a consumption Euler equation, 
which is augmented by endogenous credit constraints.  Several empirical findings emerged.  
First, households coped with the negative shocks by reducing consumption of luxury items 
while maintaining food, education, and health-related expenditures.  Second, the estimated 
results suggest that the standard consumption Euler equation, i.e., the necessary condition of 
the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis, does not hold because of binding credit constraints.  
Especially between 1997 and 1998, the probability of facing credit constraints increased 
significantly for all households.  The expected welfare loss from binding credit constraints 
increased by 45% during the crisis, suggesting the seriousness of the credit crunch at the 
household level.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The financial crisis in 1997 caused serious deterioration of household welfare in 
Korea.  The poverty head-count ratio in urban Korea jumped from 7.5% in the first 
quarter of 1997 to 23% in the third quarter of 1998 (World Bank, 2000; Kakwani, 
2000; Fallon and Lucas, 2002).   This is partly due to the increase in unemployment. 
The unemployment rate increased from 2.6 percent in 1997 to 8.7 in 1998.  In addition, 
the real GDP and real wage fell by ten and nine percent, respectively, in one year.    
The financial crisis in Korea is often referred to as a typical example of a 
“credit crunch,” which can be defined as a situation of significant credit rationing 
generated either by a sharp decline in the credit supply due to tight monetary policies or 
by an increase in credit demand (Ding et al., 1998; Agénor et al., 2000).  In fact, there 
is a large body of evidence that corroborates this view.  Ding et al. (1998) employed 
aggregate data and concluded that the sharp increase in the discrepancy between bank 
lending rates and corporate bond yields served as evidence of a credit crunch.  Using 
bank-level data, Ferri and Kang (1999) showed that banks with lower equity raised 
lending interest rates while reducing their lending capital rapidly, which consequently 
generated a credit crunch.  Borensztein and Lee (2002) used firm-level data and found 
that credit had been reallocated particularly from inefficient conglomerate-affiliated 
firms to more efficient firms.  Their results suggest that the credit crunch in the country 
may have been an outcome of the structural changes in the financial sector rather than 
that of a general monetary contraction.   
However, the existing studies on the credit crunch and the financial crisis 
exclusively focus on macroeconomic and financial aspects or impacts on firms (Furman 
and Stiglitz, 1988; Radelet and Sachs, 2000; Kaminsky and Leinhert, 1999; Ding et al., 
1998; Borensztein and Lee, 2002; Claessens, et al., 2000).  Particularly, in the above-
mentioned studies on Korea, there are no clear explanations for how the financial crisis 
and credit crunch affected the welfare of Korean households.  While anecdotal 
evidence says that, in retrospect, the negative impact of the crisis on Korean household 
welfare was smaller than was originally expected (World Bank, 2000), aggregate data 
at the household level indicate the seriousness of the credit crunch on household   3
welfare (Bank of Korea, 2000).  For example, the number of individual bankruptcies 
jumped from 1,435 in 1997 to 2,207 in 1998.  In addition, overall retail credit sales 
decreased by 32 percent from 1997 to 1998, and the overdue rate to credit card 
companies reached 20.3% in 1998.   
Our study tries to fill this gap in the current literature on the credit crunch and 
the financial crisis by conducting a formal analysis on the social impact of the crisis on 
individual households.  In the theoretical part of this study, we extend the consumption 
Euler equation by introducing the possibilities of binding credit constraints.  We will 
use this theory as our benchmark model to address to what extent Korean households 
were affected by the crisis.  In our empirical analysis, we employ household-level panel 
data collected from 1995 to 1998, and we estimate the augmented Euler equation with 
endogenous credit constraints by using a switching regression model.  The 
methodology allows us to estimate the probability distribution function of binding 
credit constraints before and during the financial crisis, which make it possible to 
quantify the seriousness of the credit crunch at the household level.  Moreover, with the 
estimated results, we can calculate the expected value of welfare loss due to the binding 
credit constraints. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework that is the basis of the econometric framework derived in Section 3.   
Section 4 contains a discussion of the data and empirical results and is followed by the 
concluding section. 
 
2.   The Model Framework 
 
Under the financial crisis, Korean households, especially the poor, were 
confronted by ex-post shocks in their day-to-day lives (Fallon and Lucas, 2002).  These 
households faced the problem of reconciling income fluctuation with a desirable level 
of stable consumption. This problem can be theoretically captured as a problem of 
intertemporal consumption smoothing under a stochastic income process.  
Households have developed several ways, such as those involving self-
insurance and mutual insurance, to cope with the ex-post risks of negative-income   4
shocks and to protect their levels of consumption (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Besley, 
1995; Morduch, 1995; Rosenzweig, 2001).  In this paper, we will focus on the two 
most important measures that households use to cope in times of crisis, which are 
consumption reallocation and the use of credit.   
First, a household can maintain total nutritional intake, while it reduces food 
purchases and other expenditures.  This is accomplished by changing the quality and 
composition of food expenditures or by reducing non-food expenditures, such as those 
for luxuries.  As revealed in recent studies on the aftermath of the currency crisis in 
Indonesia and Thailand, consumption reallocation is indeed an important coping 
strategy (Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle, 1999; Townsend, 1999).
1  Interestingly, 
Olney (1999) showed that cutting consumption was the only viable strategy of 
American households against a recession in 1930, given the high default cost on their 
loans.  Accordingly, consumer spending collapsed in 1930, turning a minor recession 
into the Great Depression. 
Second, households can use credit to smooth consumption by reallocating future 
resources to current consumption.
2   The lack of consumption insurance can be 
compensated for by having access to a credit market (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989; 
Morduch, 1994; Besley, 1995; Glewwe and Hall, 1998).  However, poor households 
usually only have limited access to credit markets and are constrained from borrowing 
for a variety of reasons (Morduch, 1990; Pender, 1996), such as asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Carter, 1988), or policy-induced financial 
repression (McKinnon, 1973).  In any case, the existence of credit constraints has 
important negative impacts on the risk-coping ability of poor households.   
In order to formalize the role of credit availability in consumption smoothing, 
we construct a model that provides optimal consumer behavior under uncertain income 
and possible credit constraints, following Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991).  Suppose a 
household decision maker has a concave instantaneous utility, U(•), of the household 
consumption, Ct.  The household decision is then to choose Ct that maximizes the 
                                                           
1 Similarly, Moser (1996) finds the importance of food substitutions and expenditure reductions in four 
poor urban LDC communities.    5
conditional expectation of discounted lifetime utility with a subjective discount rate, δ, 
subject to intertemporal budget constraints: 
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where A is the household asset at the beginning of the period.  The maximum amount 
of credit possible for this household is represented by z.
3 Note that r and y represent the 
interest rate and stochastic household income, respectively.  
When income is stochastic, analytical solutions to this problem cannot generally 
be derived (Zeldes, 1989).  However, we can derive a set of first-order necessary 
conditions by forming a value function and Bellman equation to obtain an optimum 
solution.  Let λ represent the Lagrange multiplier associated with credit constraint A+y-
C+z ≥ 0. Combining the envelope condition derived from the first-order conditions, we 
obtain a consumption Euler equation, which is augmented by the possibility of a 
binding credit constraint:  
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2 In Korea, there are extensive unorganized money markets from which households may obtain loans.  
The use of credit for consumption is the basic logic of the LC-PIH interpretation of household- 
consumption smoothing.  
3 When z is sufficiently large, this household can lend and borrow freely at a rate of interest, rt.  A case 
of complete borrowing constraint, in which a household cannot borrow at all, can be represented by z=0.   6
Note that this augmented Euler equation was first derived by Zeldes (1989).  As 
can be seen in Figure 1, we can interpret the Lagrange multiplier, λ, as an indicator of 
negative welfare effects generated by binding credit constraints.
4   Note that the 
Lagrange multiplier λt is a negative function of the current income, yt, as can be 
verified in Figure 1.  By using this figure, it is straightforward to show that given other 
variables, an increase in the current income of a credit-constrained household leads the 
marginal utility of current consumption to fall, causing the Lagrange multiplier to 
decline.   
 
3. Econometric Framework 
 
The aim of our econometric framework is to test the implications of the 
augmented Euler equation (1).  Following Zeldes (1989), we assume the rational 
expectation and the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, i.e., 
) exp( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1
t t t C C U θ γ
γ − − − = , in which θ  represents the household tastes.   Then, 
equation (1) becomes: 
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where i is the household index and e denotes the household mean zero expectation error.  
The left-hand side variable, C ˆ , indicates the first difference of log consumption or, 
approximately, consumption growth rate.  Note that the Lagrange multiplier is 
normalized by the future marginal utility of consumption: 
 





































                                                           
4 This  term,  λ, is equal to the increase in expected lifetime utility that would result if the current 
constraint were relaxed by one unit.  Because the household is constrained from borrowing more, but not 
from saving more, λ enters with a positive sign.   Pender’s (1996) result, using the Indian ICRISAT data 
set, implies that λ>0.   7
 
Then, the estimable equation becomes: 
 






where we suppose that X includes the determinants of time preference and interest rate, 
and  it v   indicates a stochastic error term including an expectation error.
5  To control for 
the changes in preferences and household characteristics, such items as household size, 
age of the head of the household, and age squared were included (Zeldes, 1989).   
Now, let C* represent the optimal consumption in the absence of a current 
credit constraint.  C* = C if the credit constraint is not binding, while C* > C if the 
credit constraint is binding.  Then, define the gap between the optimal consumption 
under the perfect credit accessibility and cash in hand plus a maximum loan, i.e., 
H=C*-(A+y+z).  Here, two factors are considered to determine whether H takes a 
positive value, i.e., whether the constraint is binding (Jappelli, 1990).  First, it depends 
on the demand for credit, which is represented by the difference between the cash in 
hand and consumption.  The second factor is how many financial intermediaries are 
willing to supply credit to this individual, which is denoted by z.  Further, following 
Hayashi (1985) and Jappelli (1990), we assume that the reduced form of the optimal 
consumption C* can be expressed as a linear function of observables, such as current 
income, wealth, age, and demographic characteristics, as well as the quadratic terms of 
these variables.  The maximum amount of borrowing is also assumed to be a linear 
function of the same variables.  Accordingly, we have a reduced-form equation:  
 
(5)       it W it it W H ε β + = ,  
                                                           
5 Note that taking a second-order Taylor expansion of log(1+e) around e=0, we obtain log(1+e)≈e-
(1/2)e
2.  In this paper, we represent the results by employing the log-linerlized Euler equation without 
the quadratic term.  Yet, recent studies by Carroll (2001), Gourinchas and Parker (2001), and 
Ludvingson and Paxson (2001) emphasize the importance of higher-order terms in the Euler equation.  
Following Dyan (1993), we also estimated the augmented Euler equation by assuming that the squared 
expectation error is captured by various characteristics of households and their heads.  The results, which 
are not reported here and available upon request from the authors, are consistent with the results 
presented in this paper.     8
 
where W includes the assets, income, and determinants of optimal consumption and 
maximum loan values and ε is an error term which captures unobserved elements and 
measurement error. 
By linearizing equation (4), we can derive the following econometric model of 
the augmented Euler equation with endogenous credit constraints: 
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Exogenous Versus Endogenous Credit Constraints 
 
The conventional empirical approach to estimate the system of equations (6) 
such as Zeldes (1989) and Morduch (1990) ignores the endogeneity of the Lagrange 
multiplier and splits the sample into those likely to be credit-constrained, i.e., λt>0, and 
those unlikely to be credit-constrained, i.e., λt=0, exogenously.  Zeldes (1989) splits the 
sample from the US on the basis of an income-to-wealth ratio.  Morduch (1990) 
utilized information on land ownership as an indicator of credit constraints of 
households in rural India. 
This exogenous split approach, however, has two problems (Garcia, Lusardi, 
and Ng, 1997, p.158; Hu and Schinantarelli, 1998, pp. 466-467).  First, it is unlikely 
that a single variable, such as an income-to-wealth ratio, would serve as a sufficient 
statistic of a consumer’s ability to borrow.  Usually, lenders screen credit applicants 
with the use of multiple factors.  Secondly, if the variables used as a criterion for 
splitting a sample were correlated with the unobserved factors in consumption growth, 
this correlation would generate an endogenous sample selection problem.  Accordingly, 
we have to correct the sample selection bias when we estimate the augmented Euler 
equation.   9
In order to overcome these two issues, an alternative approach would be to 
construct a qualitative response model of an endogenous credit constraint by defining 
an indicator variable of a credit constraint, which would be one if the credit constraint 
were binding and zero otherwise.  Such a qualitative-response model is estimated by 
Jappelli (1990).  Jappelli, Pischeke, and Souleles (1998) combined this model of 
endogenous credit constraints with a consumption Euler equation.  
However, it is not easy to identify credit constraints from data.  A direct 
approach is to utilize information on the household willingness and ability to obtain 
credit (Feder, Lau, Lin, and Xiaopeng, 1989; Barham, Boucher, and Carter, 1996; 
Baydes, Meyer, and Aguilera-Alfred, 1994).
6   Generally, such information is not 
available in standard household survey data (Scott, 2000).   
However, even in cases where the indicator variable for credit constraint is not 
observed, we can apply the estimation method of a switching model with unknown 
regimes or a version of the Type 5 Tobit model in Amemiya (1985).  Dickens and Lang 
(1985) applied this model to test dual labor-market theory.  We follow a study by 
Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997) and estimate the Euler equation augmented by 
endogenous credit constraints as a switching regression model.   
Let the Lagrange multiplier, λ’, be a linear function of proxy variables, Z, i.e., 
λ’=Zψ with a coefficient vector ψ.  Letting superscripts N and C represent the 
unconstrained and constrained groups, respectively, the estimable augmented Euler 
equation (6) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
(7)                                        0       ˆ < + + = it Nit N it N it it H if v Z X C ψ β , 
(8)                0       ˆ ≥ + + = it Cit C it C it it H if v Z X C ψ β , 
(9)                                it W it it W H ε β + = , 
 
                                                           
6 An alternative approach is to estimate the shadow values of capital for producers and compare these 
with the prevailing market loan rates.  Consistent large gaps between the shadow values of capital and 
prevailing loan rates reflect the presence of credit constraints (Sial and Carter, 1996; Carter and Wiebe, 
1990).   10
where W, following Jappelli (1990) and Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997), is a set of 
determinants of credit constraints that includes income, income squared, assets, assets 
squared, age, age squared, gender and marital status of household head, composition of 
the household, and other control variables.  Throughout the estimation, we take the 
annual growth rate of food expenditures as a dependent variable.   
The testable restriction derived from the theoretical result of the augmented 
Euler equation (1) is that the elements of the coefficient vector, ψN, are all zero for the 
non-constrained group, while the elements of the coefficient vector, ψC, are all non-
zero.   
In order to implement our estimation, we assume that errors follow a joint 
normal distribution with zero means and the following covariance matrix: 
 

































































For identification, we assume that σε
2=1.  We cannot observe H directly, but we can 
estimate the probability of being credit-constrained jointly with other parameters in 
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where  φ(•) and Φ(•) represent the density and cumulative distribution functions, 
respectively, of standard normal distribution.   Note that this likelihood function (11) is   11
the same as the one employed by Dickens and Lang (1985), Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng 
(1997), and Hu and Schinantarelli (1998). 
 
 
4. Data and Estimation Results 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We use household-level panel data that was collected through the Korean 
Household Panel Survey (KHPS) project in all prefectures except Jeju-do (see 
Appendix for detailed information of the project).  Based on a stratified random 
sampling scheme by street block, this information consists of household- and 
individual-level data files.  For our study, data over three rounds from July 1995 to 
August 1998 were used where each round covers the period from August to July of the 
following year.  The 1997-98 round is considered to reflect the period of the crisis 
since it covers the period from August 1997 to July 1998.   
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.  The average age of household heads 
was 47 in 1996 and 50 in 1998. Household size remained stable at around 3.7.  Income 
and expenditure variables are converted into real value by using provincial consumer 
price indices.  Between the 1995-96 and 1996-97 rounds, total income and wage 
earnings were fairly stable.  Moreover, the major components of expenditures are fairly 
stable in this period.  The value of household assets rose by about five percent, while 
debt declined by 11 percent during this period.   
On the other hand, with the onset of the crisis, real total income fell by 24 
percent between 1997 and 1998.  The major income component, wages, dropped by 26 
percent and was partially offset by a 28 percent increase in debt during this period.   
During the crisis, sales of assets did not increase significantly, and assets 
declined by a mere 2 percent, implying that such sales did not serve as an important 
coping device.  This may indicate that households were reluctant to sell their assets to 
cope with the negative shock since land and stock prices declined sharply.  This finding 
contrasts with the findings of Horioka, Murakami, and Kohara (2002) which show that,   12
in the 1990s, Japanese households coped with ex post income fluctuations primarily by 
drawing down their own savings.   
On the other hand, private and public transfers rose by 8 and 11 percent, 
respectively.  However, transfers constituted only 4 percent of total income, and merely 
22 percent of total households received transfers.  Public transfers consisted 
predominantly of pensions, which take 82 percent of public transfers on average, since 
most of the social safety net programs were not yet in place during the initial phase of 
the crisis, which is the period of our analysis.   
With the contraction of the economy, rising unemployment, and falling income, 
total household expenditures dropped by 29 percent between 1997 and 1998.  The 
largest drop of 63 percent was in the consumption of luxury items, i.e., leisure activities, 
dining out, and durable goods.  On the other hand, food consumption fell by only 15 
percent, and expenditures on health and children’s education, which included 
extracurricular activities and additional after-school classes, fell by 20 percent.  These 
three categories — food, health & education, and luxury goods— represented 64 
percent of the total expenditure.  Although the consumption of food, health services, 
and children’s educational services fell in absolute terms during the crisis, they 
maintained a higher proportion of the total household budget.  The share of food and 
health and education expenditures increased from 28 percent and 24 percent in 1997 to 
31 percent and 25 percent in 1998, respectively, while that of luxury expenditures fell 
from 12 percent in 1997 to 6 percent in 1998.  This suggests that average households 
were cutting back on the consumption of non-essential items to preserve funds 
available for food, health, and children’s education.
7 
 
Estimation Results of the Zeldes Type Model 
 
  First, we take an exogenous split approach to estimate the augmented Euler 
equations before and during the financial crisis.  For the former period, we investigate 
consumption growth between the 1995-96 round and the 1996-97 round, while for the 
                                                           
7 Goh, Kang, and Sawada (2001) examine the consumption reallocation pattern in Korea during the 
financial crisis.     13
latter period, we estimate the consumption growth equation between the 1996-97 round 
and the 1997-98 round.  Following Zeldes (1989), we split the sample on the basis of 
wealth to income ratios.  A household is regarded as being credit constrained if the 
calculated total non-housing wealth was less than two months’ worth of the average 
income.   
Note that the Lagrange multiplier λt is a negative function of current income, yt 
(Figure 1).  Hence, it is natural to choose the initial income, y, as an element of proxy 
variables, Z, in equation (7) and (8).  Note that Zeldes (1989) also selected the initial 
income as the proxy variable.  Given the exogenous division of household groups, we 
can estimate an augmented consumption Euler equation with income as an additional 
independent variable separately for non-constrained households and constrained 
households.  Then a testable restriction is that the income coefficient is zero for the 
unconstrained group and is negative for the constrained group. 
The estimated coefficients of the Euler equation are reported in Table 2.  The 
coefficients of initial income are negative and statistically significant for the 
constrained group but not for the non-constrained group.  These empirical results are in 
accordance with our theoretical framework.  During the financial crisis, the income 
coefficient becomes marginally significant even for the non-constrained group.  This 
may be a reflection of the negative and serious effect of the credit crunch even for those 
households who were not credit-constrained previously.   
    
Estimation Results of the Endogenous Credit Constraint Model 
  
When we assume that credit constraints are endogenously determined, we have 
to estimate parameters by maximizing the likelihood function (11).  Since the 
likelihood function is not concave in the parameters to be estimated, the nonlinearity of 
the likelihood function made convergence difficult.  However, we can achieve interior 
solutions by taking the estimated parameters of the Zeldes (1989) type model in Table 
2 as the initial values.
8   
                                                           
8 Initially, we set auxiliary parameters, (σN, σC, σNε, σCε), to be (1, 1, 0, 0).  Then the estimated auxiliary 
parameters are employed as the initial values to re-estimate all the parameters.     14
Table 3 reports the estimation results.  First, the coefficients on initial income 
for the constrained and unconstrained groups are both negative.  However, while 
income coefficients for the unconstrained group are insignificant before the crisis and 
marginally significant with 9.4% p-value during the crisis, the coefficients for the 
constrained group are statistically significant before and during the crisis at the 9.4% 
and 6.4% levels of significance, respectively.  Hence, the results suggest that the life-
cycle permanent income hypothesis (LC-PIH) is not violated for the unconstrained 
group at least before the crisis but it is violated for the constrained group before and 
during the financial crisis.  These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that the 
major source of violation of the standard LC-PIH is the credit constraint.   
Second, we found the covariance terms of the errors are not significantly 
different from zero.  This finding is in line with Garcia, et al. (1997), and is not 
surprising.  The error terms of the Euler equations are basically expectation errors, 
which, by nature, should be orthogonal to information available at the initial stage, 
including sample selection errors.  Moreover, this model is not a selection model as is 
the case in the Lee (1978) model, since households are forced to face a credit constraint, 
rather than self-selection into the credit constrained regime.   
Finally, with respect to the credit constraint equation, while the directions of the 
estimated coefficients are in line with the preceding studies on credit constraints using 
the US data sets (Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng, 1997; Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli, Pischeke, and 
Souleles, 1998), individual coefficients are not statistically significant.  Further, we 
perform a joint test where all the coefficients except the intercept in the credit 
constraint equation are zero.  We conduct Wald tests by using the results of the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimators.  The test results, which are 
summarized in Table 4, indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients in the credit constraint equation are jointly zero.  We believe that these test 
results allow us to utilize the estimated parameters of the credit equation to investigate 
the nature of the credit crunch in Korea.   
Hence, we employ these coefficients together in order to further compare credit 
accessibility before and during the crisis.  To do this, we compute the probability of 
binding credit constraints, ( ) W it W β ˆ 1 − Φ − , by using the estimated parameter vector,  W β ˆ .    15
Figure 2 compares the estimated kernel density function of the predicted credit-
constrained probability using the switching regression results before and during the 
crisis.  As we expected, the probability density to be credit-constrained increased 
during the crisis for Korean households.
9   Figure 3 further compares the two 
distributions by using cumulative density functions of predicted probabilities of 
binding credit constraints.  By looking at Figure 3, we can perform an eye-ball test of 
the first-order stochastic dominance.  It is obvious that the predicted probabilities 
before the crisis are dominated by the probabilities during the crisis. 
 
Quantifying Welfare Impacts of the Credit Crunch 
 
  From the results of our estimation, we calculate the welfare loss from binding 
credit constraints, which is represented by a triangle shown in Figure 1.  Assuming this 
welfare loss takes the form of a right isosceles triangle, it is computed by λt
2/4.  Note 
that, if the utility function is quadratic, the welfare loss becomes an isosceles triangle.  
Accordingly, with our estimated parameters, we can derive a consistent estimate of the 
expected value of this welfare loss by calculating 
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Recalling equation (3), we can quantify the Lagrange multiplier,  it λ ˆ , in equation (10) 
by using the following equation: 
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where we assume that there is no consumption tilting, i.e., δ = r.
10   
                                                           
9 We used a Gaussian kernel to estimate density.  The width of the density is selected so that the mean 
integrated square error is minimized. 
10 Note that when we compute, θ, we assume that there are no age effects in the augmented Euler 
equation.   16
By using equation (10), Table 5 represents the mean and standard deviation of 
the estimated welfare loss before and during the currency crisis, assuming the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is two, i.e., γ=2.  The expected welfare loss from 
binding credit constraints increased by 45% during the crisis, suggesting the 




In this study we investigate the welfare losses incurred by Korean households 
that are attributable to the credit crunch.  Two important empirical findings emerge.  
First, households cope with negative shocks by reducing consumption of luxuries, 
while maintaining expenditures for food, education, and health-related necessities.   
Second, we observed a significant increase in the predicted probability to be credit-
constrained during the crisis.  Hence, we conclude that Korean households suffered 
seriously from inflicted constraints in accessing credit markets during the financial 
crisis.  The results of our calculations indicate that the expected welfare loss from 
binding credit constraints increased by 45% during the crisis.   
When market or non-market opportunities for risk coping and sharing are 
limited, credit serves as an insurance substitute.  Facing negative transitory shocks, 
households can obtain credit instead of receiving insurance payments so that they can 
smooth out such shocks.  The financial crunch in Korea seems to have disabled this 
important role of credit as an instrument of self-insurance.  Such a mechanism of the 
credit crunch may have magnified the transmission of negative macroeconomic shocks 
to the entire Korean economy during the financial crisis in a similar way as in the US 
during the Great Depression (Olney, 1999).   17
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Appendix: The data  
 
The Korea Household Panel Survey (KHPS) data has a rectangular form, following the Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) of the US.  There are no replacements of households, but 
household split-offs due to marriage or other reasons are included.  The survey was conducted 
in all Korean prefectures except Jeju-do through stratified random sampling by street blocks; 
eight and seven households from each street block are randomly selected in large and small 
cities, respectively. The data consists of multi-purpose surveys in household and individual 
modules. Tables A1-A3 present some information on the KHPS. This study excludes data of 
the first and second waves because definitions of a number of variables and periods covered are 
not comparable with those in the later waves. Thus, this study examines periods from 1995 to 
1998, inclusive of the initial period of the Asian financial crisis.  
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Year identification  Wave  Period Covered 
1993  1  Jan. 92 - Dec. 92 
1994  2  Apr. 93 - Mar. 94 
1995  3  Aug. 94 - Jul. 95 
1996  4  Aug. 95 - Jul. 96 
1997  5  Aug. 96 - Jul. 97 
1998  6  Aug. 97 - Jul. 98 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1993  4547 3609 3045 2712 2571 2266 
1994   16  13  11  9  7 
1995      50 41 39 30 
1996       69  55  39 
1997       50  46 
1998        80 
Dropouts    938 564 333 141 305 
New Entry 
(Split-offs) 
  16 63  121  153  202 
Attrition rate    20.6%  15.6%  10.9%  5.2%  11.9% 
Total  4547 3625 3108 2833 2724 2468 
 
Table A3. Sample Size 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Household Lacking 
Consumption Data  0 4  18  20  0 
Household Lacking Household 
Head Education Data  220  61 46 80 70 
Total Number of Households in 
Working Panel  3567 3008 2701 2561 2238 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables (In 1995 10,000 Korean Won) 







Basic Household Characteristics     






Dummy =1 if the head is female  0.10  0.11  0.12 
Dummy=1 if the head is single  0.13  0.13  0.14 
Dummy=1 if the head is a salaried 
worker 
0.36 0.34 0.28 
Dummy=1 if the head is self- 
employed or operates a business 
0.26 0.26 0.26 
Dummy=1 if the head’s job is in 
agriculture or  fishing or temporal  
0.22 0.22 0.23 
Dummy=1 if the head is unemployed, a 
student, or retired 
0.16 0.18 0.23 






















Income, Expenditure, Assets, and Debt     
Non-durable expenditure (food, 



















Expenditures for luxuries (cultural 
activities, entertainment, dining out, 































Sales of assets (land, real estate,  
securities, and withdrawal of   







Total assets (savings account, shares, 














Outstanding debt (formal banks, informal








Number of households   2778  2629  2375   23
Table 2. The Zeldes (1989) Test: 
Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation  
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Food Expenditure 
 
 Before  the  Crisis 
(95/96~96/97) 







        
First difference of adult 

































      
Number  of  samples  940 895 900 935 
      
Note) Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White robust standard errors. 
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Table 3.  Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation 
 Before  the  Crisis 
(95/96~96/97) 







Euler  equation      
First difference of adult 


































Probability of Binding Credit Constraints 
   

















































Number of members  











Other parameters      




















      
Number  of  samples  1835  1835  
      





Table 4.  
A Wald Test for the Null Hypothesis:  
The Coefficients in the Credit Constraint Equation are Jointly Zero 
 
 Before  the  Crisis 
(95/96~96/97) 
During the Crisis 
(96/97~97/98) 
      







      









Table 5.   




Before Crisis  During Crisis 
Expected value of welfare loss from 
binding credit constraints under the 
assumption of γ=2 ￿×10
-6￿ 
0.0099 0.0145 
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Figure 2 
Kernel Density Estimates of Probability to be Credit-Constrained  
Before and During the Crisis 
 
Predicted Probability
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Figure 3 
Cumulative Density of Probability to be Credit-Constrained  
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